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Draft Recommendation
on the United States and security in Europe
The Assembly.
(i) Emphasising the need for a dialogue between members of the United States Congress and rnembers
of the Assembly of Western European Union on the organisation of security in Europel
(ii) Noting that the growing differences of opinion in the United States on its role in European security
are giving rise to a somewhat confused debate and contradictory proposals. making it difficult for Euro-
peans to draw proper conclusions;
(iii) Noting a vacuum in leadership in the organisation of European security given that the United States
is more hesitant about systematically taking the lead, while no clear European leadership has yet devel-
oped, partly because of Europe's ingrained habit of waiting for guidance from its transatlantic ally;
(ir,) Noting, however, that there can be little doubt about increasing United States reluctance to inter-
vene in regional crises in Europe which are not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty:
(v') Recalling that the European NATO members with ground troops participating in UNPROFOR
repeatedly warned against lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia;
(ti) Considering that the United States policy of secretly letting Iran send arms and military instructors
to Bosnian Government forces in breach of the arms embargo on the parties to the conflict in Bosnia, has
created further tensions between the transatlantic allies:
(v,ii) Aware that until now the United States and its NATO allies have officially maintained 20 Decem-
ber 1996 as the date of withdrawal of their troops from Bosnia;
(r'iii) Recognising that European NATO members may feel it their responsibility to maintain the peace in
Bosnia after the IFOR expiry date, but that they are reluctant to maintain a continued presence of their
troops on Bosnian territory without the participation of US ground troops;
(ix) Noting that a United States decision not to participate in such an operation might inflict serious
damage on NAIO solidarity and its cohesion;
(x) Recognising the importance of a healthy European defence industry for the economies, security and
defence of Europe;
(xi) Welcoming the WEU Council's recognition in the Birmingham Declaration that enhanced coopera-
tion in the field of European armaments will be an important part of a European security and defence iden-
tity;
(xii) Recognising that specific cooperative transatlantic defence equipment programmes such as
MEADS may be profitable and attractive for both sides from a technological, economic and political pers-
pective;
(xrul) Noting, however, that there is a continuing heavy imbalance between United States procurement of
European armaments and European procurement of United States defence equipment,
(.riv1 Stressing that the United States should open its markets to European defence equipment and genu-
inely allow a two-way street if it wishes to continue to enjoy access on an equal footing to European
defence equipment competitions in the future;
(xr,) Aware that the discussion on NAIO's enlargement cannot be removed from the agenda if only
because central European states consider membership of NATO as a panacea for all their security prob-
lems;
(xvi) Noting, however, that no unequivocal answer has yet been found to the question of whether enlarge-
ment of NATO will enhance or diminish security in Europe, given that not all central European states can
become members at the same time and that others will never become members, or might even deprive
NATO of the reason for its existence if they were to become members;
(.rvli) Recalling Assembly Recommendation 585 on security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea
area:
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(xviii) Aware of the ongoing discussion on security in the Baltic Sea area which is taking place in different
forums, such as the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Councill
(.rit) Stressing that there is no clear urgency to enlarge NATO before the European Union because of the
need to study in depth all aspects of this complicated process while also taking account of the fact that any
Union enlargement to take in central European states will not take place before 2002;
(.r"r) Welcoming the restructuring of NATO, which should also result in a streamlining of the present
command structure and allow for more flexibility and mobility in reactions to possible crisis situations;
(xxi) Welcoming the agreement on the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept,
which is to be adopted at the North Atlantic Council's meeting in Berlin in June 1996;
(-r-ril) Noting, however, that even with the implementation of the CJTF concept, there will be a grey zone
in the organisation of Europe's security without obligations or guarantees in the event of emergencies not
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
(,rxllr) Noting that after political approval by the North Atlantic Council to provide NATO assets for a
WEU- or European-led operation, the supporting commander, who will be a US officer, will have the right
to control the execution of the operation through the assets which are being provided, including the right
- 
in the event of a grave security crisis 
- 
to withdraw them before the operation is completedl
(.r:rrr'l Emphasising that the agreement now reached on CJTF provides Europe with an interim period to
start developing and acquiring its own strategic assets in the fields of lift, logistics and C4I, if it seriously
intends to develop its own security and defence identity;
(xxt') Aware of the activities of the WEU Transatlantic Forum, including the summary repofi on the mis-
sion of the Portuguese Chair of the Transatlantic Forum to Ottawa and Washington on 6-10 February
t996.
REcol,tvpNls rHAT rHe CouNctl
l. Continue and intensify the activities of the WEU Transatlantic Forum. including the organisation of
serninars and conferences both in the United States and in Europe, in order to intensify the dialogue on the
security and defence of Europe between policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic;
2. Actively investigate the possibilities for further increasing the associate partners' involvement in
WEU. in order to enhance European security in a wider context, in particular with regard to possible
consequences of a future step-by-step enlargement of NATOI
3. Use the reprieve provided by the agreed implementation of CJTF to coordinate and accelerate pre-
parations to start developing and acquiring Europe's own strategic assets in the fields of lift, logistics and
C4T;
4. Draw up, in full and harmonious coordination with the European Union, NATO and the United




(submitted by Mr Blanuw, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The security situation in Europe is chan-
ging, and the same goes for transatlantic relations.
Both in the United States and in Europe, the well-
known terms of NATO jargon such as " the
bedrock of Europe's security ", " shared values
and interests " and " the indivisibility of the secu-
rity of the United States and Europe " are still
commonly used. Is the meaning of these expres-
sions still the same? The Europeans have slowly
but steadily started to establish and develop a
European security and defence identity and the
United States, without casting doubt on its obliga-
tions under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, is
gradually making it clear that there may be occa-
sions when it might choose not to intervene and
would leave it to the Europeans to act. Combinedjoint task forces have been established to enable
Europeans to conduct military operations without
the United States participating.
2. NAIO is being restructured, and while this
time-consuming process involving a great deal of
effort is still under way, central European coun-
tries are knocking on its door to be admitted. All
this could have been managed quietly and easily if
there had been nothing else to trouble the minds
of the allies. At the same time, however, a serious
armed conflict erupted in former Yugoslavia, obli-
ging both Europeans and Americans to respond
and act. Their response and action were not
always an example of allied cooperation and even
produced mutual incriminations.
3. While there is a determination on both
sides of the Atlantic to solve the many complica-
ted issues in a true spirit of cooperation and
understanding, one cannot fail to have the impres-
sion that the debate is taking place in an atmos-
phere of embarrassment in which neither the
Americans nor the Europeans wish to address the
real issues openly.
4. The present report is the result of the dis-
cussions the Defence Committee had during its
recent visit to Washington and Norfolk in March
1996.
II. The restructuring of NATO\
command structures 
- 
a United States view
5. The collapse of the Berlin wall, the ensuing
break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union caused such radical
changes in the security environment in Europe
that it was quickly understood that a thorough
adaptation of NATO to the new circumstances
was essential if it were to remain relevant. The
changed security environment made the political
leadership of the Alliance decide to add new mis-
sions to the essential core functions of consulta-
tion and collective defence.
6. The new strategic concept, as agreed at the
Rome summit meeting of 7 and 8 November
1991, reaffirmed the core functions, but added
dialogue and cooperation with European non-
NAIO members as a new task. In addition, crisis
management was also agreed as a new area of
activity for NAIO. Moreover, enhancement of the
role and responsibilities of the European member
states was considered an important basis for the
transformation of the Alliance.
7. The NATO summit meeting in Brussels on
l0-l I January 1994 endorsed the concept of com-
bined joint task forces (CJTF) to make allied
assets available to Europeans for conducting mili-
tary operations in which the United States did not
participate (see chapter III). It also endorsed the
Partnership for Peace programme, offering Euro-
pean non-NAIO states a wide range of possibili-
ties for cooperation with NAIO.
8. It is thought that rapid advances in techno-
logy and substantial reductions in the defence
budgets of almost all NATO member states will
make it necessary for the Organisation to carry
out a thorough review of NATO's command struc-
ture. The North Atlantic Council meeting to be
held in Berlin on 3 June 1996 is expected to ask
for this review, which should be completed by the
end of the year. The review may ultimately lead to
an agreement to have fewer levels of command
and. smaller headquarters. At the same time, the
review may recommend greater flexibility and
mobility and the ability to susrain more forces
outside the NATO area.
9. In NATO, there is across-the-board consen-
sus that the existing command structure is top-
heavy, too expensive and incapable of accommo-
dating a possible NATO enlargement. In order to
meet present budget constraints, NATO com-
mands will be reduced in number and spread over
more countries, depending on how the enlarge-
ment progresses. There may also be a more regio-
nal approach to the Alliance, with its structure
being divided over five regions, one being North
4
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America. and Europe being divided into four
regions: north-east, north-west, south-east and
south-west. This would result in shorter commu-
nication lines and an improved decision-making
process.
10. In negotiations on the implementation of the
CJTF concept, France proposed the establishment
of exclusively European commands and European
" double-hatted " commanders 
- 
combining a
NATO function with a WEU/EU function. In the
French view, SACEUR, traditionally a US Gene-
ral, could be flanked by a European deputy who
could at times act independently. The United
States has always been and will remain highly cri-
tical of such proposals to " Europeanise " NATO.
unless Europe can manage to establish a coherent
policy- and decision-making structure.
11. In the framework of CJTF. it has been
agreed. however, that some staff in NATO com-
mands should have an additional responsibility
that would allow them to detach themselves and
reassemble as a European command in the event
of a European or WEU-led operation. Obviously,
the staff in question will be able to participate in
exercises to train them to carry out their secon-
dary responsibility.
12. The current command structure includes a
total of 65 NATO military headquarters, compri-
sing 2 major NAIO commands, 8 major subordi-
nate commands, 23 principal subordinate com-
mands (PSCs) and32 sub PSCs. Less than twenty
of these headquarters receive joint NATO fun-
ding.
13. When the Committee met with SACLANT
on 27 March 1996 in Norfolk, Virginia, General
John J. Sheehan explained his views on the
restructuring needed. He felt NATO should
adhere to certain guiding principles. A strong
transatlantic link should be maintained and re-
nationalisation avoided. There should be a capabi-
lity for out-of-area operations. The maintenance
of an effective operational capability within a
streamlined command structure could be facilita-
ted by the introduction of the concept of suppor-
ted and supporting commanders, while there
should be Alliance-wide management of key
functional capabilities. The European security
and defence identity should be developed within
NATO, taking the abovementioned principles into
account. The supported/supporting commander
concept, one of the key elements in combinedjoint task forces, was tested during the recent
exercises CMX 95 and Strong Resolve 95. It envi-
sages making assets and capabilities of the
Alliance available to a supported commander-in-
chief.
14. The supported commander is defined as " a
commander having primary responsibility for all
aspects of a task assigned by higher authority ".
The supporting commander is " a commander
who furnishes augmentation forces or other sup-
port to a supported commander ". The supporting
commander's task is to enhance the supported
commander's capability to accomplish his mis-
sion by increasing his ability to focus on the assi-
gned task and act decisively with confidence in
the support he receives.
15. As an example, SACLANT reminded the
Committee that. in his capacity as a supporting
commander, he provided the Standing Naval
Force Atlantic to SACEUR and AFSOUTH for
operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.
16. As regards the need for alliance-wide
management of key assets, SACLANT argued
that the establishment of a Commander-in-Chief
Support (CINCSUP) in NMO's command struc-
ture would be the logical result of fully embracing
the supporting commander concept.
17. CINCSUP should, in his view, be the single
military commander controlling lift, command,
control, communications, computer and intelli-
gence (C4I), research centres and training facili-
ties 
- 
the Alliance's key assets 
- 
with the help of







18. The present NATO command structure for
C4I is not only excessively large and extremely
expensive but is also not compatible with national
systems or between NATO headquarters. In total
7 733 posts are dedicated to Communications and
Informations Systems in order to support old,
manpower-intensive technology which has limi-
ted interoperability and is non-mobile.
19. According to SACLANT, a single subordi-
nate commander for C4I could plan, coordinate
and manage the C4I systems throughout the
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Alliance. He would be better able to understand
operational requirements of major NATO com-
mands and represent and explain their needs to the
member states, which are responsible for funding.
Compatibility, interoperability and efficiency
would be ensured.
20. Lift, or transportation, is another vital asset
for providing a rapid response in crisis situations.
At present, it is a purely national responsibility
with no single allied commander in charge. Exper-
ience in Bosnia has demonstrated that even with
extended planning times and serious coordination
efforts, the fact that transportation assets are pro-
vided by different nations under national respon-
sibility, leads to inefficiency and congestion at air-
fields and seaports. In SACLANT's view, general
transportation responsibilities and planning
should therefore be centralised under a CINCSUP
subordinate command in order to make sure that
commanders have the ability to move their rapid
reaction forces and CJTF headquarters quickly
both inside and outside their theatre of operations.
21. SACLANT went further by suggesting that
the acquisition of an enabling core capability for
lift would provide the initial rapid operational res-
ponse in crises. This core capability would also
provide lift capability immediately available for
use in support of a European-led CJTF. If required,
this core capability could subsequently be aug-
mented from national sources.
22. In conclusion, it must be admitted that there
is considerable room for improving and stream-
lining NATO command structures. In particular,
the concept of supported and supporting comman-
ders, combined with the establishment of Com-
mander-in-Chief support for Alliance-wide man-
agement of key assets could lead to reduced costs,
a more efficient command structure and enhanced
availability of key Alliance assets in crisis situa-
tions. It is also recognised that the implementation
of these concepts in combination with the CJTF
concept would provide an essential contribution
in enabling European-led forces to conduct a mili-
tary operation without the participation of United
States military forces.
23. On the other hand, it should be clearly
noted that problems may arise if the supporting
commander is a US officer. If it is agreed that the
supporting officer should have the right to control
or inspect both the aim and execution of the Euro-
pean-led operation through the assets which he is
supposed to provide, the European security and
defence identity would still be dependent on the
United States, which controls the assets that are
considered essential for European-led operations.
24. If Europe is really serious about the deve-
lopment of its security and defence identity. even
within NATO, it should either start to develop and
acquire its own assets, or insist on the supporting
commander in the NATO command structure
being a European. Apparently, the latter option as
proposed in the discussions over CJTF has been
ruled out by the Americans. While this is regret-
table, it is understandable that the Americans pre-
fer to keep control over the unique and precious
assets which they have paid for dearly.
25. It seems obvious that the Europeans have
no choice other than to develop and acquire their
own assets. The agreement now reached on CJTF
provides them with an interim period to put their
own house in order. For many years, Europe has
ensured its security and defence fairly cheaply,
because it has been able to rely on the United
States for all possible emergencies. In the fore-
seeable future, it will still be able to rely on the
Americans for North Atlantic Treaty Article 5
emergencies. For non-Article 5 emergencies, there
is a non Treaty-based grey zone. In such cases,
either the United States may participate fully and
on a voluntary basis in what can be called a NAIO
operation, or the North Atlantic Councrl may pro-
vide, also on a voluntary basis, CJTF for Euro-
pean-led operations. There are no obligations and
no guarantees for these emergencies, but Europe
has no choice but to accept this situation simply
because it lacks the means to do otherwise.
26. On the other hand, nobody can deny that
this inadequate security arrangement can only be
accepted temporarily. Europe will have to meet
the serious shortcomings in its security and
defence by starting to develop and acquire its own
strategic assets in the fields of lift, logisrics and
C4I, without delay, if it seriously intends to deve-
lop a European security and defence identity.
III. Combined joint taskforces GJTF)
27. At NATO's January 1994 summit meeting,
it was " agreed to adapt further the Alliance's
political and military structures to reflect both the
full spectrum of its roles and the development of
the emerging European security and defence iden-
tity, and endorse the concept of CJTF ".
28. It was announced that the Council. with the
advice of NAIO military authorities and in coor-
dination with WEU, would work on implementa-
tion of CJTF in such a way as to provide separable
but not separate military capabilities that could be
employed by NATO or WEU.
29. A CJTF headquarters has been defined as
follows:
" 
... a deployable. multinational, multiser-
vice Alliance headquarters of variable size,
formed to command and control, as autho-
rised, combined joint forces of NATO
nations, and possibly non-NATO nations,
for the purpose of conducting peace opera-
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tions out-of-area. A CJTF could also be
deployed for WEU-led operations. "
30. The CJTF concept should enable the Euro-
peans to have allied, and in particular US, assets
ai their disposal to conduct a military operation in
which the United States does not participate.
More specifically, the assets envisaged would
relate to the areas of command, communications,
intelligence, transport, logistics, etc.
31. The discussion on the CJTF implementa-
tion process went on for more than two years and
for a long time it was in a stalemate without any
progress being made on basic differences. In fact,
CJTF was an occasion to discuss the Europeanisa-
tion of NAIO in a barely disguised framework.
For a long time progress in the discussions was
blocked by differences of opinion between France
and the United States over command and control
of CJTF assets, and also over the question of how
NATO's integrated military should be used to
make the new concept work. A number of the pro-
blems regarding the implementation of CJTF
have been discussed in recent Assembly reports
(Documents 1457 . 1468 and 1487).
32. To the relief of many, France and the Uni-
ted States sorted out their differences at the end of
February 1996, paving the way for a full-scale
agreement by experts on CJTF, which should be
approved by the North Atlantic Council at its
meeting on 3 June 1996 in Berlin.
33. It is important to note that the CJTF head-
quarters must be capable of commanding forces
which are not part of the Alliance, while provi-
ding for the use of NAIO assets in suppoft of oper-
ations not under NATO command. It is intended
to command and control medium-sized opera-
tions, including a landforce of corps size. a naval
expanded task force and a comparable air compo-
nent. CJTF headquarters can be land-based, sea-
based or sea-based with a capability to go ashore.
34. Essential characteristics of CJTF headquar-
ters are its ability to deploy rapidly. control non-
NATO forces and manage all communications,
including receiving and disseminating intelli-
gence. It must also be capable of local protection
and self-sufficiency for 30 days. The total size of
such headquarters will be around 400 personnel.
the exact composition and size of the individual
staff sections being tailored to its specific mis-
sion. The support element and communications
and information support group are estimated at an
additional 500 and 800 personnel respectively.
35. In principle, CJTF headquarters will be for-
med from assets within the entire integrated mili-
tary structure, according to a modular approach.
On the other hand, it has been agreed to minimise
the latter in order to achieve the greatest possible
cohesion and effectiveness. The large majority of
CJTF headquarters staff will be drawn from the
same headquarters. A few major NATO com-
mands, major subordinate commands or joint
multinational headquarters will therefore be desi-
gnated as CJTF " core " headquarters with a CJTF
nucleus staff being part of the peacetime person-
nel.
36. This nucleus staff, in which all principal
staff functions would be represented, wears two
hats in carrying out both NAIO and CJTF tasks. It
is a part of the " core " which can provide an
immediate, functional staff capability for CJTF
headquarters. Officers from NAIO member states
which do not participate in NATO's integrated
military structure could be attached to such a
" core " exclusively for CJTF operations. In the
event of deployment of a CJTF headquarters for a
specific operation, the nucleus staff will be sup-
plemented by staff from other NATO headquar-
ters and participating states. Within each staff sec-
tion. one or two staff members would be
designated as points of contact for CJTF matters.
This " key nucleus staff " would be responsible
for informing their " core " headquarters com-
mander on CJTF matters, assist in generic plan-
ning, coordinate training of the entire nucleus
staff and convey updated information on person-
nel and resources from their headquarters to the
combined joint planning staff database. The
nucleus staff would be under the direction of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for CJTF matters (the
only member of the nucleus staff not wearing two
hats). To set up a CJTF headquarters, these
" core " headquarters would be supplemented by
modules from other headquarters.
31. After the Council's approval. new discus-
sions will be needed to designate elements of
headquarters (cores) and to prepare troops and
equipment (modules) for use in operations.
According to studies now in progress, three or
four existing structures such as SHAPE in Mons
(Belgium) or the headquarters of the European
Corps in Strasbourg should receive " core " sta-
tus.
38. In the framework of the compromise rea-
ched, the United States has agreed to France's
request that CJTFs might sometimes operate
under non-NATO commands, such as the head-
quarters of the European Corps in Strasbourg. The
suitability of such headquarters would need to be
certified by NATO, and, if necessary. NATO
would provide assistance to upgrade them.
39. France, for its part, has agreed that CJTFs
would require political approval from the North
Atlantic Council. It has also agreed that NAIO,
having lent equipment for a CJTF, would, in the
event of a grave security crisis, have the right to
take it back before the mission was completed'.
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40. The United States has stipulated that CJTF
assets should still be controlled by SACEUR
(Supreme Allied Commander Europe). SACEUR
would have the role of supporting commander,
with the right to control or inspect both the objec-
tive and the execution of the operation through the
assets he is supposed to provide to the Europeans.
The upshot of this arrangement will be that
through the CJTF, the United States will always
have a veto on European military operations.
,11. It is emphasised that prior planning, prepar-
ation and training will be essential to ensure the
successful execution of CJTF operations.
12. A combined joint planning staff will be res-
ponsible for the direction, coordination and super-
vision of the planning tasks which are implemen-
ted at the military strategic level in support of the
CJTF concept.
43. Early designation of means that are imme-
diately available is intended to facilitate rapid
establishment of a coalition as soon as Europeans
demonstrate a common political will to resolve a
conflict.
44. Contrary to what has been suggested by
some, IFOR in its present form is not a forerunner
of CJTF deployment because it is a military oper-
ation with full US participation, placed from the
outset under NATO command. It could become a
candidate for CJTF implementation if, after the
envisaged withdrawal of US troops. the Euro-
peans decided, in agreement with the signatories
of the Dayton Accords, to stay on, using NATO
assets for command. intelligence and logistics, for
instance.
45. The CJTF concept has already been tested
in different forms during exercises such as Strong
Resolve 95 and CMX 95.
IV. NATO enlargement
46. At a summit meeting in Cracow in October
1991. the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland adopted a declaration which recogni-
sed the dangers posed by the break-up of Yugosla-
via and the Soviet Union and stated that their
countries' security would be best served by inte-
gration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO). They urged full membership of NATO
lor all European counlries.
17 . NATO. which had started work on the estab-
lishment of a pan-European North Atlantic
Cooperation Council. indicated that it was not
prepared to entertain the notion of membership
for the former Warsaw Pact countries. It maintai-
ned this position for some time, but the subject of
enlargement nevertheless became part of its dis-
CUSS1ONS.
48. In December 1992, Albania became the
first former Warsaw Pact country to apply for-
mally for NATO membership. Also, new appeals
for early NATO membership from the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland were given the
cold shoulder by the Organisation.
49. Meanwhile, Russia had begun to put pres-
sure on NATO member states to delay admission
of central and eastern European countries. In late
September 1993, the Russian President, Boris
Yeltsin, wrote to leaders in France, Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States, warning
that opening NATO membership to the former
communist states of central and eastern Europe
would constitute a violation of the 1990 Treaty on
the Final Settlement on Germany.
50. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in
Brussels in December 1993, endorsed the " Part-
nership for Peace " (PfP) concept offering bilat-
eral cooperation to former member states of the
Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics, but
avoided promising them any firm security guaran-
tees or timetable for NATO membership.
51. In a communiqu6 released after the NATO
summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January
1994, the heads of state and of government reaf-
firmed that:
" the Alliance, as provided for in Article l0
of the Washington Treaty, remains open to
membership of other European states in a
position to further the principles of the
Treaty and to contribute to the security of
the North Atlantic area. " They expected
" and would welcome NATO expansion
that would reach to democratic states to
[the] East, as part of an evolutionary pro-
cess. taking into account political and secu-
rity developments in the whole of Europe. "
52. Meeting with leaders of the Visegrad group
in Prague on 12 January 1994, President Clinton
declared that " the question is no longer whether
NATO will take on new members. but when and
how. "
53. Relations between NATO and Russia
became steadily more complicated with Russia
insisting upon special status within the PfP pro-
gramme as a precondition for its participation, but
it finally joined the programme in June 1994
without special status.
54. At the CSCE's biennial summit meeting
held in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, Presi-
dent Clinton and President Yeltsin expressed shar-
ply differing views. President Clinton stressed the
United States commitment to NATO enlargement
but rejected any attempt to veto such enlargement
by a state which was not a member of NAIO. Pres-
ident Yeltsin made it clear that enlargement of
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NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries
would be regarded as a threat to Russia.
55. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in
Brussels on 1 December 1994. reaffirmed its
commitment to enlargement, but carefully refrai-
ned from setting a timetable or naming new mem-
bers. It approved a study " to determine ... the
implications of membership ", due to be comple-
ted by the end of 1995.
56. At the G-7 summit meeting in Moscow, the
British Prime Minister, John Major, stated " I
don't think there is any threatening aspect at all to
NATO expansion 
- 
nor is there any great hurry
about it."2 Now that the allies have, for a variety
of reasons, started to wonder whether there is any
hurry over enlargement, NATO expansion may
" suffer death by erurui over time " r.
57. Many arguments have been put forward by
advocates and opponents of NATO enlargement
and it may be useful to summarise them here,
although the list is not exhaustive.
(a) Argumerts in favour of enlargement
58. These fall into three separate groups. The
first regards enlargement as a strategic response to
possible adverse developments in eastern Europe.
NATO expansion, it is said, would strengthen the
military position of the West, which could be of
importance in the event of the resurgence of a
Russian threat. This could occur, it is argued. if
democratic reform in Russia were to grind to a
halt and Russian politics became dominated by
nationalists and old-style communists in favour of
an imperialist foreign policy, a component of
which might be an attempt to put pressure on for-
mer allies and republics of the Soviet Union.
59. NATO must be both clear and strong in its
attitude towards Russia. It should always be sure
of maintaining the initiative and should therefore
not delay too long before enlarging. If NATO
adopts a wait-and-see attitude. this could lead to
the communists regaining power in the former
Warsaw Pact countries. Containment of commu-
nism and protection from communist rule were
the basic reasons for the establishment of NAIO.
It should not fail in its duty in this respect, even
though the cold war has ended.
60. A second group of arguments considers
enlargement to be the guarantee of stability and
democracy in central and eastern Europe. It would
provide a clear security framework for those
countries which are undergoing a potentially un-
stable transition from communism to dentocracy.
This transition could be threatened by the cont-
inuing existence of a security vacuum between
Germany and Russia where free rein might be
2. Intervrew n Arguntentf i Fakn,
3. Wull Street Jountol, 23 Aprrl 1996.
given to rekindling nationalism and earlier pat-
terns of geopolitical competition and conflict.
Potential ethnic strife in a number of countries
might possibly lead to regional wars. Instability in
that region may also be conducive to nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons proliferation *.
NATO, it is argued, should therefore expand
without waiting for future enlargement of the
European Union, which is regarded as another
i mpofi ant stabi I ising factor.
61. NATO enlargement could reduce uncer-
tainty in a hypersensitive area of Europe, and the
resulting stability on the continent could benefit
Russia as well as other countries.
62. Central and eastern European countries
also have a need for sensible arrangements for
integrating their armed forces in their societies.
NATO enlargement would meet the need for secu-
rity in the new member states and would support
the process of democratisation, while helping to
integrate the armed forces in the new state struc-
tures.
63. Another argument put forward is that tnany
people fear the power of a unified Germany.
Pushing NATO's eastern borders to the Polish-
Ukraine frontier would be a way of reassuring and
anchoring Germany in the West. The German
Defence Minister, Volker Riihe, also considers
Poland's presence in NAIO the best guarantee of
a safe Polish-German border. NATO enlargement
would transform Germany from a front-line state
into the central state in a new Europe.
64. A third set of arguments has to do with rela-
tions between the United States and Europe. These
concentrate on the United States' policy of using
NATO as a vehicle for retaining its influence in
Europe, which could advance US interests. The
advocates consider it likely that admission of new
members would enhance US influence in NAIO
because the views of those countries on most
important security issues are similar to those of the
United States'. The United States' bid for expan-
sion is also inspired by NATO's critics within
Congress. who suggest that the United States may
lose interest in maintaining the Alliance unless
NATO plays a leading role in stabilising central
and eastern Europe. Bosnia is an example. At pres-
ent, it is argued, Europe cannot take care of its
security and meet any significant challenge arising
within its own area. NATO therefore has to be pre-
served in order to ensure that the United States
retains its military commitments. guaranteeing
Europe's security and defence.
-1. E. Mortimer, " The distant drunr ... ", Tlrc Fitrunt'nl Tintes.
25 January 1995.
5. Bruce Weinrod, " NAIO expansion: m1'ths and realities ".
a Hentage Foundation Special Repon to the Senate Armed
Sen'rces Committee and House of Representatives National
Secunty Committee. I996.
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65. There is even the suggestion that NATO
needs to expand for its own sake and for its survi-
val, or, as the United States Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, said on one occasion: " The
Alliance must be relevant to the post-cold war
situation. "
66. It is frequently argued that early enlarge-
ment was proposed by the United States partly for
electoral reasons at home, given the very substan-
tial Polish and other central and eastern European
immigrant vote.
67 . If the central European countries in particu-
lar were to join, their membership would give
NATO the strategic depth as a defence alliance
which has been lacking in the past. There is also
an ethical argument that Atlantic democracies
must fulfil their responsibilities and moral duties.
to the effect that countries which over the last fifty
years have paid with their freedom for the stabi-
lity and security of western Europe cannot be left
out in the cold.
(lt ) Argtunenls aguirtst enlorgentent
68. The arguments against NATO enlargement
can, broadly speaking. be divided into two
groups: the one supportive of good relations with
Russia. the other fearful of undermining NATO as
a strong and cohesive security organisation.
69. Those in favour of good relations with Rus-
sia argue that NATO enlargement will create new
dividing lines and lead to new East-West confron-
tation. Pro-western liberals in Russia would be
accused of throwing away Russia's position as the
most powerful state in the region, which could
provide the radical nationalists and communists
with more opportunities for attaining power and
reversing Russia's evolution towards democratic
structures and a market-orientated economy.
70. According to Russia's view. NATO's east-
ward expansion seems to suggest that Russia
constitutes a permanent threat to Europe's bor-
ders. If there u,ere no threat, there would be nojustification for NATO to expand and by doing so
it could precipitate the very circumstances it is
seeking to avoid. It is said that Russia. witnessing
the massive growth of an organisation from which
it is now excluded and which the former Soviet
Union, rightly or wrongly. perceived as its main
security threat. will feel obliged to protect itself
and start a build-up of arms and armed forces at its
borders. NATO could retort that it has not the
slightest intention of threatening Russia, but it
should bear in mind that, in strategic considera-
tions, even a perceived threat is a factor that
counts.
1 l. President Boris Yeltsin has gone so far as to
say that NATO enlargement would lead to a cold
peace. Russia would regard the new European
security configuration with an enlarged NATO as
illegitimate since it would be imposed in the face
of Russian opposition. The new post-cold war
security arrangements which Russia has agreed to
are the main reason why NAIO expansion would
be not only unwise but unnecessary. There is no
security vacuum because the restructured OSCE
and recent conventional and nuclear arms control
agreements give Europe a common security order
based on consensus and cooperation. Moreover,
enlargement is not necessary because Russia is
very weak militarily. Russia's armed forces are in
a very poor state, to the extent that the country
cannot mount a successful military operation
large enough to threaten any central or eastern
European country. The guiding principle of any
post-cold war European security architecture
must be to avoid a new division of Europe or the
formation of new blocs. The proposals of some
supporters of enlargement to refrain from
deploying allied forces on the territory of the new
member states smacks of an attempt to introduce
second-rate membership with reduced security
guarantees.
72. Enlargement would endanger Russian
cooperation in the framework of arms control
agreements and lead to unwanted pressure on
Ukraine, which is concerned that Russia will then
seek to accelerate the political and military inte-
gration of the Commonwealth of Independent
States and transform it into a Russian-led security
alliance.
13. There must also, it is argued, be the fear
that. in the event of an emerging military threat
from Russia. a revived KGB would have no diffi-
culty in recruiting collaborators from among for-
mer colleagues in the NATO forces of central and
eastern European member states.
14. Recently, opponents of enlargement have
come up with new arguments that, among other
things. concern NATO itself. Inviting new mem-
bers into a consensus-based alliance is always
risky. If the United States were at present to apply
pressure on its reluctant European allies to
consent to some hurried scheme of eastward
expansion. it might jeopardise vital transatlantic
cohesion. The central and eastern European can-
didates for NATO membership are not used to
cooperating in a collective endeavour to face a
common threat. From a position of simply having
to obey orders from the Warsaw Pact leader, it
might take them a long time to adapt to new mili-
tary cooperation. The Partnership for Peace is there-
fore the best way forward.
15. Expansion to the east would impinge upon
the cohesion of the Alliance. It could paralyse and
undermine NATO as it exists today, as increas-
ingly divergent security interests could seriously
hamper the process of reaching consensus. Since
19,19 NATO has admitted only four new mem-
bers: Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain and it is
l0
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a well-known fact that two of these long-standing
member states are not always inclined to compro-
mise for the sake of consensus. Supporters say
that democracy in the former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries will be enhanced and consolidated by NATO
enlargement, but NATO neither guarantees nor
requires democracy. Salazar's Portugal was regar-
ded as a faithful NATO ally because the United
States needed the Azores as a base. The 1961
coup in Greece led to seven years of military rule
and yet the country remained a NATO member, as
did Turkey during the years of military rule.
76. Nor is NATO an effective instrument for
promoting free markets or democracy. NATO,
unlike the European Union, is not an economic
organisation offering capital, market access and
economic cooperation.
77. Opponents of enlargement also argue that
many candidates are not ready to join NATO. All
of them lack modern military equipment, money
and technological know-how and their system of
command and control is very different from that
used in NAIO. Although several studies have
been published recently, no-one has yet given any
reliable estimate of the cost of the accession of
new member states, or said who is to pay and how.
78. If NATO is to be enlarged without station-
ing troops or weaponry in the new member states
and without adapting their infrastructure and
armed forces to new defence requirements, what
then is the value of security guarantees?
(c) Latest developments irt NATO's enlarge-
n'Lent process
79. During a visit to the central European and
Baltic states in April 1996, Mr Javier Solana.
Secretary-General of NATO, attempted to explain
the NATO enlargement process. He made it clear
that, in his view " free choice of alignment must
be the very basis on which any post-Yalta Europe
must be built ". He did not commit himself to any
timetable for enlargement, but emphasised that it
would happen. Mr Solana rejected Russian sug-
gestions that the central European countries could
only join NATO's political, not its military struc-
tures, adding that: " Those who join will be full
members with all the benefits and obligations that
membership implies. NATO is not interested in
semi-detached members."6. He repeated that none
of the eleven countries currently seeking to join
NATO had been ruled out.
80. On the other hand, both the Americans and
NATO officials admit that NATO membership
will be more difficult for some countries to attain
than for others. If Estonia and Latvia for instance
were to become members, it would take NAIO to
Russia's borders 
- 
both countries have very large
Russian ethnic minorities and Estonia still has an
unresolved border dispute with Russia.
81. A new Rand Corporation study again ques-
tions the viability of NATO membership for the
Baltic states, also because of potential trouble
with Russia. It also doubts whether security gua-
rantees can be given in a crisis where NATO
forces would have to travel I 000 to 1 500 kilo-
metres from their bases in westem Europe. This
problem could be overcome by a permanent
deployment of NATO forces in those countries,
but that could only be done at high cost and the
provocation in Russia's eyes could be consid-
erable'. Among European NATO members, Den-
mark is the strongest advocate of Baltic member-
ship and has indicated that NATO will have to
propose a new strategy if it was not possible for
the Baltic states to join the first wave of new
NATO member states.
82. In order to meet Baltic security concerns, a
suggestion has been made in the United States
about creating a separate Baltic security zone which
would also include Finland and Sweden. The Baltic
states could then become members of the European
Union and at the same time be closely tied to the
PfP through an institutionalised arrangement.
83. Even at this stage of the enlargement dis-
cussion, there is little clarity about the costs, not
least because they depend on many impond-
erables which have not yet been sorted out.
84. A Rand Corporation study shows that costs
could swing from a low of $ 14 billion to a high of$ll0 billion, depending on how robust NATO's
force posture in the new member states will be. A
Congressional Budget Office study, working on
similar assumptions, has put a price tag of bet-
ween $60 billion and $125 billion on NAIO's
enlargement to take in Poland. Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In general, hou'-
ever, the Rand study has used less robust military
requirements in its analysis of options for defen-
ding central Europe.
85. According to Rand. the four new member
states would have to pay about $13 billion to
upgrade their forces and military infrastructure.
The present 16 member states would have to
double NATO's $1 billion infrastructure budget
and improve its capabilities for rapidly moving air
and ground forces into central Europe, if neces-
sary. Over the next decade, France, Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States would
have to pay an extra $17 billion, and the other
twelve present members an extra $12 billion.
While Rand estimates the cost to the United States
at between $420 million and $2.4 billion per year,
the Congressional Budget Office puts it at a mini-
mum of $5 billion per year.
1l
6. The Finant'ial Times. 19 April 1996. 7 . De.fense Neu's, 22-28 April 1996.
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86. Although in public the United States Admi-
nistration is in favour of enlargement and is not
inclined to give in to any Russian pressure concer-
ning this issue, it is perfectly clear it has also
understood that there is little point in pushing
enlargement at the moment. There is, apparently,
an undeclared policy of refraining from any
serious decision on enlargement until the political
situation in Russia has stabilised, hopefully after
the June 1996 presidential elections.
87. At present, bilateral technical consultations
are taking place between NATO member states
and the eleven candidates for membership on a
16 + 1 basis and no formal enlargement discus-
sions are planned until NATO's internal assess-
ment is completed in December 1996. Recently.
several critics have for various reasons expressed
serious doubts about whether it would be wise to
push for early enlargement of NATO, as is still
officially being advocated by the United States.
88. Although there seems to be general consen-
sus among NATO member states that continuing
with the Atlantic Alliance serves their vital secu-
rity interests, there is no consensus over NATO's
missions. The Alliance, they say, should first be
revitalised and transformed through a package of
political measures and institutional reforms, as
part of a new " transatlantic bargain " between the
existing 16 member states, before new members
are invited to join. The revitalisation process
should be concluded at a NATO summit meeting
in the first half of l99l , after the presidential elec-
tions in the United States *.
89. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Yevgeni
Primakov, recently declared that Russia was pre-
pared to accept eastward expansion of NATO,
provided that it did not imply an allied military
force near Russia's borders. Despite the absence
ofplans to deploy short-range nuclear weapons on
the territory of prospective eastern European
members, he saw military infrastructure as a
source of concern which could influence Russian
policy. Mr Primakov reserved Russia's right to
respond if its proposals did not lead to a solution o.
90. The US Secretary of State, Warren Christo-
pher, has repeatedly said that the United States is
committed to NATO enlargement, no matter what
happens in Russia, but has added that " Russia
rnust not isolate itself " "'. US officials have admit-
ted that it is not the United States' intentron to iso-
late Russia. Although NATO enlargement will not
be subject to a Russian veto, events in Russia may
have a significant, if not decisive effect on the
pace and style of NATO enlargement.
8. Stanley R. Sloan in " NATO's Future: Bcyond collective
def-ence ". Washington DC. 1996.
9 Internutional Herald Tribune,6 and 7 April 1996.
10. Internutionul Haruld Trrburte. 2l March 1996.
V. The role of the United States
in the Bosnian conflict
91. The armed conflict in Bosnia came to a
provisional end with the signing of the Dayton
Accords in November 1995. Many considered
these agreements as an American triumph after
four years of United States reluctance to inter-
vene. Why did the United States not intervene in
this conflict three or four years ago'? And why did
the Clinton Administration change its opinion in
the spring of 1995? There was a mixture of
motives and political objectives for the US policy
as regards former Yugoslavia which made it no
less muddled than the often criticised European
policy on that issue. The reasons why the US
Government put aside its earlier reluctance and
pushed actively for an agreement are manifold
and are connected with both domestic and foreign
policy.
(a) Wbt did the Uited States not interfere at the
beginning of the conJlict?
92. Before intervening in a conflict that does
not threaten its own borders or those of its allies. a
state should at least address the following ques-
tions: is military action in the national interest; is
there a reasonable chance of success; can the state
muster the requisite domestic support; is there a
moral motive?rr
93. When the conflict in Bosnia was in full
swing. reports on refugees, mass-murder and eth-
nic cleansing caused a public outcry, but this
movement was not strong enough to justify mili-
tary intervention by the United States. The other
three requisites were not met. First of all there
were not enough strategic arguments for interven-
tion. Although there was a possibility of a spill-
over into other regions and countries such as
Kosovo, Macedonia and Turkey. it was conside-
red too remote to warrant a response. Unlike
Kuwait, Bosnia did not have any strategic raw
materials which could have prompted the United
States to intervene. The US Administration was
well aware that unless it could present a military
mission as serving important US national inter-
ests, the public would not support even low levels
of casualties.
94. An alternative to the direct use of US mili-
tary force was to give support to the Bosnian
Government so that it could defend itself against
military aggression. The lifting of the arms
embargo was the only effective option that did not
risk American lives. but the Clinton Administra-
tion did not know the extent ttf the opposition and
how to meet itrr.
I l. J. Joffe in " The new Europe. vesterday's ghosts ",
Foreign Af1airs, volume 72, No. I, 1993.
12. PD. Wolfowitz, " Chnton's first year ", Foreign AfTairs.
volume 73. No.1. 1994.
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95. Finally, it was also clear that there would
not be any chance of a quick and reasonable suc-
cess without the loss of many US soldiers' lives,
although fbrceful military action could have suc-
ceeded at the very beginning of the conflict.
Since, in the early stages, the various parties in the
conflict were not prepared to stop fighting, mili-
tary intervention of a limited scope would only
have stopped the mass killing for a while. Besides
these reasons, there were also some military
objections to intervention such as the difficult ter-
rain and bad weather.
96. Apart from the abovementioned considera-
tions, mainly of a domestic and strategic nature,
which dissuaded the United States from inter-
vening, there were also foreign policy considera-
tions which will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
97 . First of all, the European Union had made it
clear that it wanted to cope with " European secu-
rity " by itself after its failure in the Gulf war. The
US was therefore somewhat conveniently obliged
to wait and see. Depending on their point of view,
some critics called it " shifting responsibility
away from the US towards Europe ", and others a
demonstration of American weakness and inabi-
lity to lead.
98. Initially, the United States also had no wish
to become involved in a peacekeeping mission
because that would have obliged its troops to
remain neutral. The United States wanted the
country to remain multi-cultural and therefore
thought it necessary to help the Bosnian Govern-
ment. It also wanted to support the Bosnian Mus-
lims because it clearly considered them to be the
victims of aggression and it was afraid that if the
West did not help the Bosnians they would turn to
countries like Iran, entailing a risk of fundamenta-
list infiltration into Europe.
99. The United States was unable to help the
Bosnians defend themselves at that early stage,
partly because doing so might have endangered
the peacekeeping forces that were already there
and it faced opposition from its allies and Russia.
Therefore there were no possibilities fbr the US to
achieve its goals in the flrst years of the conflict.
100. In the early phase. the US Administration
saw the conf-lict as a clear-cut case of Serbian
aggression. This opinion made it oppose the
Vance-Owen plan which gave 437o of Bosnian
territory to the Serbs. The Administration made
moves to set up a UN tribunal to try Serbs for war
crimes, and it proposed to the European allies a
programme for lifting the arms embargo on the
Bosnian Muslims and striking the Serbs with air
power, with the ultimate aim of restoring Bosnia
as a sovereign, multi-ethnic and territorially intact
state. When Europe rejected the lift and strike
idea, the US Administration came to appreciate
that in this crisis it could only act in concert with
the EU and the Russian Federation. So there
emerged a profound incompatibility between the
Administration's initial objective and the require-
ments of multilateral action. Unilateral actions
might endanger interests carrying greater weight
than those that would be secured through such
action. Once it became clear that the interests at
stake in Bosnia concerned the future of the post-
cold war order in Europe and the cohesion and
existence of the transatlantic alliance. the US
Administration concluded that it would be absurd
to pursue a course of action that would estrange
the United States from both Europe and Russia
while drawing the nation deeper into the Bosnian
conflict.
(b)What made the United States change its ntincl?
101. The US Administration was facing increa-
sed domestic pressure to " do something " and as
a result, on 11 November 1994. it announced that
it would no longer enforce the arms embargo
against former Yugoslavia, causing dismay
among the European allies and Russia. Republi-
can leaders called the United Nations " totally
incompetent " and argued strongly for an aggres-
sive bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb and
Yugoslav targets to " paralyse " Serbian society.
Secretary of State Warren Cristopher responded
with the argument that a bombing campaign was
unworkable and that only a diplomatic solution
was acceptable, but President Clinton declared his
willingness to deploy US ground troops to assist
NATO in operations to withdraw UNPROFOR
troops from dangerous situations. Meanwhile the
then French Foreign Minister, Alain Jupp6,
condemned governments " which teach us lessons
daily but have not lifted a little finger to put even
one man on the ground ".
102. The " dual key policy ", which required
both NATO and the United Nations to agree on
the use of air strikes before any action could be
taken, was one of the most serious flaws in the
agreements to help UNPROFOR implement rts
tasks. This deficient command structure often
resulted in a delay of several days before the
request was implemented, reducing its effect to
almost zero.
103. At the beginning of June 1995. at the initia-
tive of the newly-elected French President.
Jacques Chirac, the Defence Ministers of NATO
and some other European states agreed on the
creation of a rapid reaction force under the com-
nrand of the United Nations. This force consisted
mainly of British, French and Dutch troops with
the following tasks: retaliate in the event of an
attack on United Nations forces: assist isolated
units to regroupt support the besieged enclaves of
eastern Bosnia; resupply the besieged peace-
keepers; and police the UN-declared weapon-free
zones. The US Congress opposed a 3l7o share of
l3
DOCUMENT 1519
funding, delaying American approval of the rapid
reaction force. US officials were concerned that
the new force would give the United Kingdom
and France undue influence in international
policy-making regarding Bosnia.
104. The dramatic fall of Srebrenica, followed
by mass executions of many of its male inhabi-
tants, was the result of another of the unsatisfac-
tory arrangements which had been made for the
protection of " safe areas ". The attack on Sre-
brencia by Bosnian Serb forces started on 6 July
1995 but the first two air strikes on the Bosnian
Serb tanks which were closing in were not carried
out until l1 July, while a third air strike was halted
after Bosnian Serbs threatened to kill the
UNPROFOR soldiers they were holding hostage.
105. There were far too few ground troops
deployed to provide eff'ective protection of this
" safe area ", while requests for protective air
strikes were systematically carried out too late
and with too little force to have any effect on the
attackers.
106. Once Croatia. with the tacit approval of the
United States, had regained control of the Krajina
region as a result of a military operation. the Uni-
ted States launched a new peace initiative on
9 August 1995, based on the 1994 proposals of the
Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, United
Kingdom. United States) on territorial division.
This time the division roughly reflected the situa-
tion on the ground. Two days later, President Clin-
ton vetoed the earlier congressional decision to
lift the arms embargo, arguing that ending the
embargo would intensify the fighting, jeopardise
diplomacy and make the outcome of the conflict
in Bosnia an American responsibility.
10'7. Afier a fresh massacre of civilians at a
Sarajevo market by Bosnian Serb bombing at the
end of August, NATO responded with operation
" Deliberate Force ". Apparently impressed by
this series of devastating air attacks on Bosnian
Serb targets across Bosnia from 30 August to 14
September 1995, Bosnian Serbs began to take
notice. At the end of the first day of attacks, it was
announced that the Bosnian Serbs would hence-
forth conduct peace negotiations as part of a team
headed by President Milosevic, which was widely
regarded as a significant shift in their position. On
14 September, after 850 NATO bombing missions
and the first use of Tomahawk cruise missiles in
the offensive, Bosnian Serb leaders finally com-
mitted themselves to withdrawing their heavy
weapons from a 20-kilometre exclusion zone
around Sarajevo. In Geneva, on 8 September,
representatives of the Contact Group and the
foreign ministers of the Croats, Serbs and Mus-
lims signed an agreement on the basic principles
for a peace accord. This was followed by a second
agreement signed in New York a few weeks later.
The agreements included the following prin-
ciples: the continued existence of Bosnia-Herze-
govina within its present international borders;
Bosnia would consist of two entities; the Federa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of
Serbia; both entities would have the right to estab-
lish parallel special relationships with neighbour-
ing countries and would hold fully democratic
elections.
108. At the beginning of October, President
Clinton announced a 60-day ceasefire. The final
peace negotiations in Dayton in the first three
weeks of November divided Bosnia in two parts:
49Vo tor the Republika Srpska and, 5l%o for the
Muslim-Croat Federation, joined by a loose poli-
tical structure.
109. Europe disappointed Washington by its fail-
ure to deal with the Bosnian conflict. On the other
hand, the United States policy which finally resul-
ted in the Dayton Accords, based on earlier Euro-
pean efforts, is more than anything else a policy of
containment and nobody dares to predict what
will be the future fate of the Balkans. US inter-
vention in Bosnia came reluctantly and it was a
consequence of the outrage the US public felt
over what the United Nations and western Europe
had allowed to happen. The UN embargo on arms
for the victims of aggression and the passivity of
the United Nations in the face of genocidal
crimes. first prompted President Clinton to cam-
paign in 1992 to arm the Muslims and then
pushed Congress to force Clinton to keep his pro-
mise despite Europe's objections. As the IFOR
presence will end by December 1996, the Bos-
nians are expected to take care of themselves there-
after. This will be facilitated by the United States
re-arming the Bosnian Government and providing
the necessary military training, but few observers
would be surprised to see a new outbreak of
armed hostilities.
ll0. Many have noted that the current interven-
tion of the United States has everything to do with
the coming elections in 1996. It cannot be denied
that President Clinton faced major problems in
getting his federal budget and welfare policy
adopted and obviously the best way for the Clin-
ton Administration to draw attention away from
these problems was to achieve a major foreign
success. The link between Clinton's decisions
affecting Bosnia and the presidential elections is
naturally den ied by Admini stration officials.
111. It has been rightly observedI that the Uni-
ted States did have some interests in Bosnia, some
of which are only too obvious such as halting the
killing or preventing the conflict from spreading
and turning into a Christian-Muslim war. Another
even more important reason was to ensure that the
conflict did not end in a way that would perma-




nently damage the United States' ties with its
European allies, NATO and Russia.
ll2. Croatia's recapture of Krajina in August
1995 also resulted in creating a more convenient
balance of power between the parties to the
conflict in Bosnia. The United States had suppor-
ted the Croatian operation because they were
convinced that it would help bring the Serbs back
to the negotiating table. With this in mind. one
could say that the Dayton Accords were des-
igned at the right time to take advantage of the
political momentum created by Croatia's victory
over the Serbs in Krajina. This is precisely why.
according to its advocates, the Dayton Accords
may succeed: they are based on the military situa-
tion which was established in August 1995. In
addition to this, there was mounting pressure for
peace negotiations from Congress and also from
the Europeans, who wanted a decision by early
autumn on whether to withdraw their troops.
113. Another important reason that led the Uni-
ted States to change its mind and intervene acti-
vely, was the need to repair its tainted image in
world politics. where it claimed to be an effective
trouble-shooter. It is said that the United States'
choice to finally get involved in the Bosnian
conflict was a choice for post-cold war leadership,
but others argue that the American problem is not
a lack of power but a decline in its capacity and
wrllingness to use it. US policy in Bosnia does not
hold out a guarantee of US intervention in future
crises on European territory 
- 
it is more a
demonstration of an existing power vacuum in
European security.
ll4. The lack of resolution and the failures of
the European Union, the United Nations and
NATO gave the United States a feeling of dissa-
tisfaction which led it to intervene in the conflict.
It wanted to show Europe that if the United States
was in charge, it could do the job. Disagreement
between NATO members damaged the prestige of
the Atlantic Alliance to the great regret of the
United States and it felt a strong need for a coor-
dinated powerful action to improve NATO's stan-
ding. The need to create consensus within Europe
and NATO became a goal in itself. Through its
military intervention in Bosnia, NATO showed
that it was still a coherent and powerful organisa-
tion and this was exactly what it needed after the
embarrassments of recent years.
115. Of course, the United States also had moral
arguments for intervening. The United States
chief negotiator for the Dayton Accords, Richard
Holbrooke, said that the fall of Srebrenica and the
events that followed provoked the change ''. Fur-
thermore, he observed that President Clinton
faced a dilemma because he knew that the United
States would get involved in one way or another:
either by helping the UN peacekeepers to with-
draw or by sending ground troops.
(c) Crntclusiort
116. The expectations for the future in Bosnia
are not altogether bright. Although most people
concerned try to have faith in the Dayton Accords,
it is admitted that many problems remain. The
Muslims and Croats in the Federation do not seem
to get along as well as was hoped and there is still
a chance that the Bosnian Serbs might want to
seek an association with Serbia. More sceptical
observers might say that the United States inter-
vened to help the Bosnian Muslims survive, thus
enabling its European allies to transfer responsibi-
lity for the outcome of the conflict to the United
States. In the end, the United States may have to
face the reality that the deployment of military
force cannot produce a lasting solution but only
one that will continue until the foreign troops
have left. The present US containment policy in
the Balkans has, for the time being, stopped the
killing, which is a huge success in itself, but it has
stopped short of addressing the basic issue, the
status of minorities throughout former Yugosla-
via. As a result of this, the parties to the Dayton
Accords may again take up arms, breaking the
enforced peace. As far as Europe is concerned,
there is still the question of what to do next.
VI. Arms for Bosnia
111 . Throughout the conflict in Bosnia, the Uni-
ted States and Europeans have been at odds over
the question whether the Bosnian Muslims should
be re-armed or not. The United States was faced
with the dilemma of showing solidarity with its
European allies or with the Bosnian Muslims. the
latter in order to prevent Iranian fundamentalists
from securing a foothold in Europe. It tried to do
both and the final outcome may be that in both
cases it only succeeded partially. The Bosnians
got their arms but because of this the Iranian fun-
damentalists also gained entry into Bosnia.
Europe saw an ally pretending to show solidarity,
but in fact turning a blind eye to breaches of the
overall arms embargo.
118. At the beginning of April 1996 it became
known that. in 1994, covert Iranian arms ship-
ments reached Bosnia-Herzegovina while the US
Administration was publicly defending the United
Nations arms embargo.
ll9. According to accounts in the United States
press which have not been contradicted by the
Administration, the President of Croatia, Franjo
Tudjman, had informed the United States early in
1994 that Iran was offering to supply Muslim
forces in Bosnia, through Croatia's offices, with
rifles, ammunition, mortars, anti-tank weapons
and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
l5
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After internal consultations which also involved
President Clinton, the United States envoy in
Croatia was told to say that they had " no instruc-
tions " on this question 
- 
a diplomatic way of
saying that the United States would not object to
the arms shipments.
120. Within days, Iranian arms were on their
way to Bosnia viaZagreb, where Iran Air aircraft
unloaded weapons under Croatian military guard.
The Iranian arms shipments certainly contributed
to reinforcing the Bosnian forces and helped the
Croats, who appropriated 30Vo of the shipments,
to bring the Bosnian Serbs, who were far better
equipped with heavy weapons, to a standstill.
These shipments are said to have continued until
January 1996.
l2l. According to the New York Times, there
are also indications that United States diplomats
helped to clear a passage through Croatia to Bos-
nia for convoys containing the arms, although
they may not specifically have known that wea-
pons were on boardrs.
122. In fact. it should be noted that the United
States Congress had always advocated an " arrns
for Bosnia " policy and, on l l May 1994, the Uni-
ted States Senate voted narrowly in favour of a
unilateral United States breach of the arms
embargo imposed on former Yugoslavia. One of
the main arguments for this vote was that the
embargo violated the right of United Nations
member states, including Bosnia, to self-defence.
President Clinton. who months earlier had
consented to the Iranian arms shipments, repudia-
ted the Senate vote on 25 May, arguing that a
unilateral United States decision to ignore the
embargo would " kill the peace process, sour our
relationship with our European allies in NATO
and the UN, and undermine the partnership
[that the United States was] trying to build with
Russia ".
123. On 8 June 1994. the House of Representa-
tives also voted in favour of unilaterally breaching
the embargo. despite interventions by the Deputy
Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, the Defence
Secretary, William Perry, Ambassador Madeleine
Albright and Chief of Staff, General John Shali-
kashvili, who all argued that lifting the embargo
would stop the peace process and make the
conflict continue without any guarantee that the
Bosnian Muslims would be able to recapture one
inch of territory.
124. Meanwhile, it had been claimedro that. with
the tacit consent of the United States Government.
Iran had dispatched a lbrce of 400 Iranian revolu-
tionary guards to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it
was training and arming Bosnian government
forces. It was further claimed that the United
15. Tlte Nety Ynrk Times,20 Aprrl 1996.
16. The Waslington Tunes,2 June 1 994.
States Government was ignoring allegations that
Iranian arms were being delivered to Bosnia via
Croatia in the guise of humanitarian aid. On 14
August, after President Clinton himself had also
started to press for a lifting of the arms embargo
against Bosnia, France's Prime Minister, Mr Bal-
ladur, warned that if the embargo was lifted, 5 000
French UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina would be withdrawn for safety reasons.
European foreign ministers, meeting on 11 Sep-
tember 1994, warned of the " incalculable conse-
quences " of a decision of the sort for which the
United States Administration was looking.
125. Domestic pressure on President Clinton
apparently became unbearable and, on 1l Novem-
ber 1994, it was announced that the United States
would no longer enforce the arms embargo in the
Adriatic Sea. The European allies, with whom the
United States had until then been monitoring the
embargo in a concerted NATO-WEU operation
called Sharp Guard, were astonished and descri-
bed the United States decision as " worrying ".
The then Secretary-General of NATO, Willy
Claes, pledged to " continue fully and totally all
United Nations Security Council resolutions
which form the basis of [NATO's] involvement in
former Yugoslavia ".
126. The WEU Council in its Noordwijk Decla-
ration of 14 November 1994 maintained that it
intended " to continue to work together in close
cooperation with the North American allies. The
security of the Alliance and of Europe as a whole
is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests
on a shared foundation of values and interests. "
127. At the same time. the Ministers " reiterated
their view that lifting the arms embargo would
cause the conflict to escalate further. pose grave
risks to the civilian population and to organisa-
tions in the field. leading to a situation in which
United Nations forces had to withdraw " ''.
128. They further took " note with regret of the
United States measures to modify its participation
with respect to the enforcement of the arms
embargo in the combined WEU/NATO Operation
Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. " ... " Ministers also
emphasised that the United States measures
would not affect WEU's determination to conti-
nue ensuring compliance with the relevant resolu-
tions of the United Nations Security Council.
Ministers reiterated their intention to continue to
implement fully the enforcement of all embar-
goes. "
129. The arms from Iran helped restore the mili-
tary balance and contributed to the conclusion of
the Dayton Accords. But at the same time, lran
may have secured a bridgehead in Europe which it
will not give up easily. The Dayton Accords them-
r6
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selves call for all foreign fighters within the local
armies to leave Bosnia and western allies have
exerted pressure on the Bosnians to expel the
mujaheddin who came from Iran or elsewhere to
help the Bosnian Muslims fight their adversaries.
Some have been sent back to their native lands
while others have taken Bosnian nationality and
are entitled to stay. According to United States
officials, about 150 to 200 members of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard are still in Bosnia, along
with Arab Islamic militants who fought in volun-
teer units18. In the future, Iranian advisers may
pose a threat to peacekeeping troops and to a
secular government in Bosnia.
130. It recently became known that agents from
the Iranian Ministry of lntelligence and Security
have trained commando units employed by the
Bosnian Agency for Investigation and Documen-
tation to kill or capture people accused of war
crimes.
13l. The United States has called for the dis-
bandment of this seemingly exclusively Muslim
intelligence agency within the Bosnian-Croatian
Federation because it is a violation of the terms of
the Dayton Accords'u.
132. A secret military cooperation agreement
concluded in December 1995 between Iran and
Croatia, including an Iranian proposal to deliver
surface-to-surface missiles to Sarajevo and
Zagreb as well as a plan to exchange Croatian and
Iranian military personnel, was blocked when the
United States received information about it.
133. The fact that the United States consented to
Iranian arms shipments is all the more bizarre
given that it has consistently preached total isola-
tion of Iran, accusing it of heavily sponsoring ter-
rorism and carrying out a programme to develop
nuclear weapons. European governments have
committed themselves to a " critical dialogue "
while maintaining trade relations, taking the view
that isolation will not help Iran change its behav-
iour. Europe has argued that isolating the Iranian
fundamentalist government leaves it without any
international diplomatic options.
134. The United States argues that Europe's
" constructive diplomacy " will allow Iran's mili-
tant mullahs to continue flouting established stan-
dards of international behaviour without being
held to account.
VII. MEADS
(medium extended air defence system)
135. In February 1995, the United States,
France, Germany and Italy signed a memorandum
of understanding to develop a medium-range anti-
18. Intenmtional Heruld Tribune,26 April 1996.
19. Intenrutional Herald Tribune,26 Aprll 1996.
missile defence system called MEADS (medium
extended air defence system). The new system is
intended to replace the Hawk and Patriot by a
mobile missile with a range of 100 kilometres and
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with
nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. The
procedure for the MEADS programme makes
provision for a competition to set up the project
definition and validation phase and the selection
of one of the two project teams to design and
develop MEADS in late 1998. Production should
begin in 2005 followed by MEADS entering into
service during the following decade. The two
competing teams would be Hughes/Raytheon
with the European firms Alenia, A6rospatiale,
Dasa. Siemens and Thomson versus Lockheed
Martin with the same European industries in a dif-
ferent set-up. The project cost is estimated at $40
billion with the United States contributing 50%,
Germany and France 207c each and ltaly ll%o.
However. the four countries which signed the
1995 MOU have not yet succeeded in harmoni-
sing their requirements for MEADS. In fact,
MEADS has become the subject of a conflict bet-
ween the Clinton Administration and the Republi-
can Congress over missile defence. The Adminis-
tration is emphasising theatre missile defence
(TMD) with MEADS as a priority programme.
The Congress is aiming for a missile defence pro-
gramme which takes national missile defence as
much into consideration as TMD. At present,
Congress is giving lower priority to systems such
as MEADS than to a core group of four other
theatre missile defence systems.
136. In France, a debate is under way over whe-
ther to pursue MEADS or instead concentrate on
new versions of the SAMP/T. a Franco-Italian
ground-launched, medium-range air defence mis-
sile which could be modified to include a limited
capability against tactical ballistic missiles. The
SAMP/T, developed as a replacement for the
Hawk and Patriot air defence missiles, has a
potential export market estimated at more than
$20 billion. Understandably, the European indus-
try involved in this programme is reluctant to
share it with its United States competitors.
131. It is said that French government and
industry officials consider MEADS more as a
political symbol of transatlantic cooperation than
as a viable military or industrial development pro-
gramme. French defence industrialists say that
France has all the basic components for an anti-
missile system at its disposal in the fields of mis-
siles, radar and systems.
138. At a meeting of the four participating
nations on 15-16 April 1996, France announced
that it would be unable to make a commitment to
MEADS before completing the final version of its
weapons procurement programme law for 1997-
2002, which is expected in May 1996 and is to be
t1
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discussed in parliament by the end of June. Apart
from budget constraints, the failure of the four
governments to agree on military requirements
for MEADS has been mentioned by France as a
reason for postponing its commitment.
139. The deadline for launching the MEADS
programme has now been postponed until mid-
May and it seems unlikely that France will be able
to meet it. The other participants have indicated
that the deadline could be defered, if need be, and
have stated that French participation at a later
stage would still be welcome"'. It should be noted
that adopting this accommodating attitude cannot
have been difficult for them, considering their
own reservations about making a firm commit-
ment at this stage.
140. The United States Defence Secretary.
William Perry, has said that he considers MEADS
as " the most important test of transatlantic coop-
eration " and he argues that " the United States
cannot indefinitely postpone the start of the pro-
gramme "r'.
l4l. In March 1996, however, the United States
Senate Armed Services Committee was told that
MEADS was a high priority programme but that
the government had not yet entered into a com-
mitment to field MEADS because of United
States concern over its high (507o) share in the
programmer:.
142. Why does the United States Administration
consider MEADS an important test of transatlan-
tic cooperation? r3 According to Dr Paul
Kaminski, Under-Secretary of Defence Acquisi-
tion and Technology. the United States' general
reasons for transatlantic cooperation in arma-
ments development are threefold:
- 
cooperative programmes help strengthen
the connective tissue between the US and
Its allies:
- 
with an increased likelihood of operating
in coalition environmenrs, the allied
countries need to stress interoperable
equipment and rationalised logistics;
- 
with all allied defence budgets shrinking,
equipment which individual allies cannot
afford may become affordable through a
common effort.
143. The United States is well aware that most
of the problems in armaments cooperation have
always revolved around narrow national interests
20. Defense Ney's, l5-21 and22-28 April 1996.
21. Le Monde, 27 March 1996.
22. Defense Nev's, 15-21 Aprrl 1996.
23. For a detailed drscussion of this issue, see Robbrn Laird.
" Medium extended air defence system and the Euro-Atlantic
defence relationship ".
being at odds with broader cooperative interests,
one of the best known problems being the percep-
tion of the United States leading a programme
using US technology and a US prime contractor,
with European participation being relegated
essentially to sub-contractor status.
144. On the other hand, Under-Secretary
Kaminski has made no secret of the Administra-
tion's opinion on increasing European defence
cooperation. Speaking at a public conference, he
said that " the concept [of increasing European
defence cooperation] ... is welcomed 
- 
so long as
it doesn't come at the expense of the transatlantic
link. " Among the possible negative outcomes,
Paul Kaminski mentioned:
- 
closing out US technologies and exper-
tise from European developments and
markets:
- 
development of non-interoperable sys-
tems:
- 
greater costs to the European allies with
less security to show for it;
-reinvention of existing technologies
when research and development budgets
are declining;
- 
political divisiveness between long-term
friends.
145. At first sight, these arguments could be
interpreted as evidence ofheartfelt concern for the
European allies. In particular. the last four argu-
ments are heartwarming. But Europeans should
not forget that the first argument is the one that
really counts.
146. Due to shrinking defence budgets in the
United States as well, equipment programmes
have been reduced or cancelled and the US
defence industry has gone through a ruthless
restructuring process, shedding tens of thousands
ofjobs, a process which only the strongest preda-
tors have survived. These giant industries, which
have no equivalent in Europe, are engaged in a
worldwide battle for markets and customers with
the strong support of the United States Adminis-
tration. As a result of increased European defence
cooperation. the US defence industry has lost a
part of the European market where it used to have
a virtual monopoly. It will leave no stone unturned
to regain its European market and MEADS is
considered a potentially promising new starting
point.
147. Before committing themselves to the
MEADS programme, the European governments
and defence industries should address a number of
related questions. How much chance is there that
MEADS will survive as a programme in the
ongoing battle between the United States
Congress and the Administration over missile
r8
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defence systems? It may even fade away after
development money has been spent. The United
States has a poor record in abiding by such devel-
opment agreements. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the United States' unilateral withdrawal
from transatlantic programmes such as the modu-
lar stand-off weapon, the 155 autonomous preci-
sion-guided munition and the NATO identifica-
tion system was not an encouraging experience.
148. When will NAIO finish its study on coun-
ter-proliferation requirements? At present, no
agreement has been reached on priorities for spe-
cific TMD deployments within the Alliance.
MEADS is intended to be used by mobile inter-
vention forces, but which allies are likely to oper-
ate with US forces out-of-area and beyond the
reach of other US-allied theatre missile defence
capabilities? A decision on MEADS can only be
taken within the framework of a general strategic
choice over missile defence systems. giving rise
to questions such as whether priority must be
given to missile defence of allied territory or of
mobile intervention forces. Or should both
defence systems be deployed at the same time in
order to prevent " catch 22 " situations?
149. What will be the consequences of a Euro-
Atlantic cooperative MEADS development for
the European defence industry? Will it again grad-
ually be pushed into a sub-contractor role or will
it gain from the research and development exper-
ience in the anti-missile defence systems, espe-
cially as regards C' systems which must be inter-
operable in order to make sure that allied
operations are successful?
150. In no way should transatlantic equipment
cooperation programmes lead to a weakening of
Europe's defence industrial base, which is consid-
ered vital for reinforcement of the European secu-
rity and defence identity.
151. United States calls to revitalise transatlan-
tic defence equipment cooperation will meet with
little enthusiasm in Europe as long as the Penta-
gon does not operate a two-way policy in its
acquisition programmes.
VIII. Conclusions
152. What will be the outcome of recent deve-
lopments in United States policy regarding secu-
rity in Europe? Before drawing conclusions, it
may be useful to sum up some of the most salient
aspects of the relations between the transatlantic
allies.
153. President Clinton was elected because he
promised to concentrate more on domestic issues.
Endeavouring to avoid foreign policy as a field of
priority action, the President started very actively
applying a commercial policy of trade expansion.
The tactics used certainly led to success, but the
political consequences were not always positive.
Both transatlantic and transpacific relations soon
became frayed because US trade demands were
seen as predatory and unreciprocated. Given the
United States position as the only remaining
superpower and the hopes this aroused in crises
and conflicts all over the world where states or
nations are being threatened, attacked or are brea-
king up. this abstention from foreign policy did
not last very long.
154. The United States soon became involved in
the crises in Somalia, Haiti and also, without
immediately taking the lead, in former Yugosla-
via.
155. Europeans may have a distorted view of
United States intervention in the Balkans. The
United States does not pretend to have a vision of
the future shape of the Balkans and their role in
Europe. At present, the main objective of the US
Administration is to preserve a peaceful status
quo in the whole region. Serbia and Bosnia are the
focus of this containment policy, but there is cer-
tainly more to it than that, which is why 650 Uni-
ted States troops are deployed in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as a
warning that neighbouring countries should not
interfere. The United States is also active in Alba-
nia to prevent destabilising developments in
Kosovo and other neighbouring regions.
156. It has also fbrged defence links with Croa-
tia and Romania despite concerns over their
human rights records and commitments to politi-
cal and economic reform.
157. The United States argues that the parties in
the conflict in Bosnia were only prepared to make
peace when NATO projected power in a convin-
cing and sustainable way. Bosnia, it says,
demonstrated the need for United States and
NATO involvement in maintaining European
peace.
158. In fact. the United States has from the out-
set thought that only a firm policy could provide a
key to solving the Bosnian conflict. The election
of President Chirac in France, who clearly came
down in favour of a more aggressive attitude in
Bosnia, caused a rapprochement between the Uni-
ted States and Europe, which was accelerated by
the dramatic fall of Zepa and Srebrenica.
159. In the US Congress, there is growing scep-
ticism about the transatlantic ties that were so
vital for the security of Europe during the cold
war.
160. It should be noted that 186 members of the
House of Representatives, i.e. nearly half of its
total number. were elected in the last two elec-
tions. They did not actively participate in the liber-
ation of Europe at the end of the second world war
l9
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and the Korean and Vietnam war is history for
many of them. In fact. they are the first post-cold
war generation of lawmakers in Congress.
16l. Many of these younger members of
Congress are questioning the guiding principles
which have been the basis of United States
foreign policy since the end of the second world
war. Some of them are not even sure about the
value of NATO. arguing that its ruisort d'|tre was
to counterbalance the threat of communism to
western Europe, a threat which 
- 
they point out 
-
no longer exists in its former dimension.
162. Observers also argue that many of the new
members becarne involved in foreign policy in
particular as part of their effort to alter the direc-
tion of domestic policy. Their main goal is to
reduce the deficit and the size of the federal
government.
163. Some go as far as to say that the United
States is gradually falling back into a policy of
isolationism. However. isolationism in the strict
sense of abstention from engagements abroad, is
no longer a viable option for the United States.
Economic interests cover the whole world, indus-
try relies on exports and on fbreign investment
and finance. The country as such is not self-suffi-
cient and for many decades now, has no longer
been physically secure from an armed attack on
its territory.
164. Opinion polls consistently show that Amer-
icans are very ambitious about United States
world leadership, but that enthusiasm cools when
costs and risks are cited. On Bosnia, the US public
was not opposed to United States involvement,
but it wanted to be convinced that there were good
reasons for it.
165. The United Srates still has its imporrant
security commitments in Japan and Europe and is
committed to NATO and Russian reform. but the
reason for these continuing commitments is that
the foreign policy and defence establishment
thinks that change could be perilous.
166. During the recent crisis between Greece
and Turkey over the island of Imia/Kardak.
Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs, who does not like to
mince words, criticised European foreign and
security policy as follows:
" While President Clinton was on the
phone with Athens and Ankara. the Euro-
peans were literally sleeping through the
night. You have to wonder why Europe
does not seem capable of taking decisive
action in its own theatre. "
167 . It was rightly pointed out recently that
these words, coming from a man who has done
everything possible to refocus United States
attention on Europe and to assert its commitment
to European security, should be read as a warning.
Europe will put too much strain on that commit-
ment if it does not quickly develop some capacity
of its own to manage crises and prevent conflicts
within the European theatre ra.
168. Notwithstanding all its efforts, Europe has
not been capable of preventing or stopping the
armed conflict in former Yugoslavia through a
common, and in the beginning a less common,
approach.
169. The question is: why do people and states
in the world take more notice of the United States
than of Europe? One vital reason is that, contrary
to Europe. the United States is able and willing to
convert its material assets into power, notably in
the form of troops and weapons, and to deploy
them around the world.
170. The results of this approach were again
demonstrated in Bosnia. When NATO. with the
active support and participation of the United
States in " Operation Deliberate Force ", laun-
ched a series of devastating air attacks on Bosnian
Serb targets across Bosnia from 30 August to 14
September 1995, Bosnian Serbs took notice and
were soon sitting round the negotiating table and
signing the Dayton Accords.
11l. In general, there can be linle doubt that rhe
United States supports the establishment of a
European common foreign and security policy
because it believes that its development would
make the European Union a more effective part-
ner. It is aware, however, of the many problems
still to be solved, such as the hesitation of key
member states to relinquish their foreign policy
prerogatives in favour of a common approach and
the ability to project a credible threat of military
power.
172. Both Atlantic partners seem to be too shy to
discuss their real feelings and continue to stick
plasters over a festering abscess which at some
time will have to be removed. In joint communi-
qu6s, they continue to use the same phrases as
were in fashion during the cold war. while the
context has changed out of all recognitron.
113. Europe.does not have to become a super-
power. omnipresent in the world, to wield
influence. If, however, it wishes to be an effective
regional power, it needs to develop a capacity to





in dealing with conditions which may pro-
duce a crisis. Ideally. all the various instruments
which can be used to deal with crises should be
available to a single decision-making body.
Europe needs the will to develop power-wielding
instruments and the resolve to act collectivelv and
use those instruments.




174. It may be true that the crisis in Yugoslavia
came too early to test the European common
foreign and security policy which was agreed in
Maastricht six months after events in Yugoslavia
took a wrong turn. Now, five years later, with the
United States having announced in 1995 that its
troops will leave Bosnia on 20 December 1996,
Europe cannot use a similar argument that the
intergovernmental conference has not yet finished
and that it is too early to apply an effective com-
mon policy. Does Europe prefer to continue dis-
cussing the institutional details of a common
foreign and security policy or does it wish to act?
175. Failure by the European countries to re-
unite to fight the main threat in Europe's neigh-
bourhood may prove the fatal blow to everything
else that has been accomplished in the cause of
European unity 25.
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